We study equilibrium trading strategies, market liquidity, and price efficiency in an economy in which a fraction of better-informed speculators displays preferences consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) Prospect Theory, i.e., loss aversion, risk seeking over losses, and nonlinear and asymmetric probability weighting (in the spirit of Jullien and Salanié, 2000) . Loss aversion induces those speculators to trade more cautiously, while risk seeking induces them to trade more aggressively, with their private signals. We demonstrate that the latter effect dominates the former in equilibrium, leading to lower and (because of procyclical subjective loss probabilities) countercyclical adverse selection-based market liquidity and higher price efficiency. We also find that the presence of those speculators affects the extent to which the release of public news about the traded asset's terminal payoff improves market liquidity and price efficiency and makes such improvement procyclical. JEL classification: D82; G14
Introduction
Over the past two decades, a large and long-standing body of experimental evidence on human behavior has provided support to the notion, first formulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) as Prospect Theory, that the decision-making process of economic agents may depart from the predictions of standard expected utility theory. Prospect Theory proposes that those agents assess gambles with a value function defined over gains and losses relative to a reference point (instead of the absolute level of financial wealth or consumption), concave over gains (risk aversion), but convex (risk seeking) and steeper (loss aversion) over losses. Prospect Theory also suggests that, in assessing gambles, economic agents employ nonlinear and asymmetric transformations of the objective cumulative probability distribution of payoffs overweighting its tails. In particular, Jullien and Salanié (2000) find that those agents are disproportionately afraid of the low probability of a loss when selecting gambles with high probability of a gain. Recent work employs modified versions of this theory to study the pricing of financial securities. Prospect Theory arguments have been used to explain such known asset pricing puzzles as the magnitude of the equity premium, excess stock return volatility, momentum and the disposition effect, the value premium, or stock return predictability and its implications for portfolio selection. 1 The past two decades have also been characterized by an increasing interest in the study of the process of price formation in financial markets. A voluminous literature known as Market Microstructure, fueled by the vast amount of information that these markets now produce and make available to researchers, has studied (both theoretically and empirically) such issues as the mechanisms through which private and common information are impounded into prices, aversion induces PT speculators to more cautious trading with their private signal, the more so the greater is their marginal loss probability; risk seeking induces PT speculators to more aggressive trading with their private signal, the more so the greater is their subjective (i.e., transformed) cumulative loss probability. In equilibrium, the latter effect dominates the former, and PT speculators trade more aggressively than the otherwise identical MV speculators. Such additional aggressiveness makes the order flow more informative about the risky asset's fundamentals and the MM's adverse selection problem more severe. 4 We also show that the presence of PT speculators makes average equilibrium adverse selectionbased market depth countercyclical, i.e., lower during "good" times (positive private signals) than during "bad" times (negative private signals). An intuitive explanation for this finding is that ceteris paribus, PT speculators' subjective cumulative loss probability is higher (and their riskseeking behavior more intense) the greater is the private signal they observe (and the price at which they trade) -i.e., is procyclical -which leads to greater trading aggressiveness and worse market liquidity. Consistently, recent empirical evidence suggests that market and stock-level liquidity may be state-dependent (and possibly countercyclical), especially that of smaller firms, where PT speculation may play a bigger role (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Chordia, Shivakumar, and Subrahmanyam, 2004; Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz, 2007; Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2007; Deuskar, 2008) . Nevertheless, these papers do not directly test whether those dynamics can be attributed to the presence and trading activity of PT speculators.
The econometrician cannot observe speculators' private signals when estimating traded assets' market depth and price efficiency. However, public information about traded assets' fundamentals is frequently released to all market participants, typically improving both (e.g., Pasquariello and Vega, 2007) . We therefore extend our model to consider whether the presence of PT speculators affects the impact of such a release on a traded asset's process of price formation. The amended model generates a rich set of state-dependent comparative statics. In particular, we find that the extent of that improvement is sensitive to the fraction of PT speculators in the economy and greater the better public news is released and/or the better private news is available (i.e., is procyclical), because those circumstances affect the informativeness of the aggregate order flow and the severity of the MM's perceived adverse selection risk.
Our work is related to Subrahmanyam (1991) and Foster and Viswanathan (1993) . Subrahmanyam (1991) allows for noncompetitive, risk-averse speculators in the one-period noisy rational expectations model of Kyle (1985) . In this paper we abstract from imperfect competition to concentrate on the implications of Prospect Theory preferences for liquidity and price efficiency. Unreported analysis indicates that our intuition would be basically immune from such an extension. In addition, we show that our benchmark model is able to replicate the main comparative statics in Subrahmanyam (1991) . In a similar setting, Foster and Viswanathan (1993) demonstrate that price impact and the variance of prices are state-dependent when representing speculators' beliefs with elliptically contoured distributions. However, there is little or no evidence guiding the analyst's modelling choice for those unobservable beliefs. In our model state-dependency ensues from state-dependent, Prospect Theory-inspired preferences even when all random variables are normally distributed. Another related literature explores asset pricing implications of investors exhibiting either irrationality or bounded rationality. 5 All agents in our model, including the fraction of better-informed speculators displaying nonconventional preferences, are instead fully rational.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we construct a benchmark model of trading. In Section 3, we introduce PT speculators and discuss the implications of their presence for market liquidity and price efficiency. In Section 4, we enrich the model by endowing each agent with a public signal of the traded asset's liquidation value. We conclude in Section 5.
5 E.g., Barberis, Schleifer, and Vishny (1998) , Hong and Stein (1999) , Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) , and Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerfield (2006) .
The Benchmark Model
In this section we describe a benchmark noisy rational expectations model of trading in the presence of better-informed, risk-averse agents and derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium trading strategies, adverse selection-based market depth, and price efficiency. The model's structure is similar to Kyle (1985) and Subrahmanyam (1991) ; yet, we assume that those agents take the equilibrium prices as given, in the spirit of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Verrecchia (1981), and Verrecchia (1982) . This assumption is made solely for simplicity. Allowing for imperfect competition complicates the analysis that follows considerably without significantly affecting its main intuition. 6 The benchmark model's implications for market liquidity and price informativeness are standard. In the next section we enrich this basic structure by introducing informed agents with Prospect Theory-inspired preferences and consider the properties of the ensuing equilibrium. All proofs are in the Appendix unless otherwise noted.
Risk-Averse Speculators
The basic model is a two-date, one-period economy in which a single risky asset is exchanged.
Trading occurs only at the end of the period (t = 1), after which the asset payoff, v, is realized.
The economy is populated by three types of traders: A continuum of risk-averse informed traders (that we label speculators) with a total mass of one, liquidity traders, and a competitive, riskneutral market-maker (MM). 7 All traders know the structure of the economy and the decision 6 For instance, when the risk-averse informed agents are assumed to be imperfectly competitive, a closedform expression for the equilibrium market liquidity cannot be obtained, as in Subrahmanyam (1991) . Further, Kovalenkov and Vives (2007) and Vives (2008) show that in the presence of risk-averse informed traders, a pricetaking rational expectations equilibrium provides a reasonably close approximation to the corresponding strategic equilibrium. 7 For an analysis of risk-averse market-making in an adverse selection model à la Kyle (1985) , see Subrahmanyam (1991) .
process leading to order flow and prices.
At time t = 0 there is neither information asymmetry about v nor trading. Sometime between t = 0 and t = 1, all speculators receive a private and noisy signal of v, S = v + u. The random variables v and u are assumed to be mutually independent and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ At time t = 1, both liquidity traders and speculators submit their orders to the MM, before the equilibrium price P has been set. Liquidity traders generate a random, normally distributed demand z, with mean zero and variance σ 2 z . For simplicity, we assume that z is independent from all other random variables. We denote the speculators' market order by x; thus, their profits from trading are given by π = x (v − P ). Conditional on S, the speculators choose their position in the risky asset to maximize their expected CARA utility
It is well known that the above problem is equivalent to the speculators maximizing the meanvariance (MV) function
with respect to x (e.g., Huang and Litzenberger, 1988, pp. 265-266) . Standard formulas for the moments of a conditional normal distribution (e.g., Greene, 1997, p. 90) imply that the unique solution of this strictly concave program is:
where φ = 
Market Liquidity and Price Efficiency
The MM does not receive any information, but observes the aggregate order flow ω = x MV + z from all market participants before setting the market-clearing price P = P (ω). Dealership competition and risk-neutrality then imply semi-strong market efficiency:
We provide the resulting closed-form expression for the equilibrium price satisfying the zeroexpected profit condition of Eq. (4) in the following proposition.
Proposition 1
The unique rational expectations equilibrium price P MV of the model described by Eqs. (1) to (4) is
where
The equilibrium market liquidity (depth) in P MV -the inverse of the price impact λ MV of Eq.
(6) -reflects the MM's attempt to be compensated for the losses he anticipates from trading with better-informed speculators, as it affects his profits from liquidity trading. Consistent with Kyle (1985) , market liquidity deteriorates (λ MV increases) the more uncertain is the risky asset's liquidation value v (i.e., the greater is σ 2 v ) since the more valuable is speculators' private information, the more aggressive is their trading activity (e.g., for any P MV ,
and the more vulnerable is the MM to adverse selection. Accordingly, market liquidity improves if the speculators' private signal S is less precise (i.e., the greater is σ 2 u ) or in the presence of more intense noise trading (i.e., the greater is σ 2 z ). Consistent with Subrahmanyam (1991) , market liquidity deteriorates the less risk averse the speculators are (i.e., the lower is α) for they trade more aggressively with S. The following corollary summarizes these basic properties of λ MV of Eq. (6). These parameters also affect the extent to which prices reveal private information in the equilibrium of Proposition 1. As in Subrahmanyam (1991) , we define the informational efficiency (informativeness) of prices to be the posterior precision of the asset payoff v conditional on the price P (or the order flow ω) as
Using properties of the normal distributions and Eqs. (3), (5), and (6), it is straightforward to
, where
We then have Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 Equilibrium price informativeness is decreasing in σ Intuitively, price efficiency Q MV is decreasing in the uncertainty surrounding the risky asset's payoff v, as in Kyle (1985) . Furthermore, Q MV is decreasing in the quality of the speculators' private information (i.e., the greater is σ 2 u ) and their risk aversion (i.e., the higher is α) for those speculators trade less aggressively with their signal S, pushing P MV away from v. In Kyle (1985) , noise trading does not destabilize equilibrium prices for it brings forth more trading by risk-neutral informed agents. Kyle (1985) and Subrahmanyam (1991) observe that price informativeness does instead decline in the presence of imperfectly competitive, risk-averse informed agents, for they trade less aggressively in response to a greater σ 2 z . In our setting, price informativeness declines in σ 2 z as well, yet because more intense liquidity trading does not affect the trading activity of perfectly competitive, risk-averse speculators, hence unequivocally reduces the adverse selection risk for the MM.
A Model of Trading with Prospect Theory
In their seminal work, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
Prospect Theory Speculators
We assume that, within our benchmark economy, a fraction μ of the competitive, better-informed agents makes trading decisions under Prospect Theory (PT), while the rest (MV) trades according to Eq. (3). Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose a specific power utility function over trading gains and losses π based on experimental evidence:
This functional form, plotted in Figure 1 (dotted line), captures the main element of Prospect Theory for it is mildly concave over gains, and convex and steeper over losses. Yet, it makes the PT speculators' problem intractable to solve in our setting. Therefore, in the spirit of Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and , we assume that PT speculators choose 8 E.g., see the surveys in Camerer (2000) , Santos (2001), and Nofsinger (2005) .
the optimal trading strategy that maximizes the following piecewise expected utility:
and γ > 0. 9 This value function -whose realizations over the domain of π are plotted in Figure 1 (solid line) for α = 1 and γ = 3 under the assumption that P = 0 -has the following properties: i) it reduces to MV speculators' strictly concave utility (thin line) when γ = 0, ii) it leaves PT speculators as risk-averse as MV speculators over gains; iii) it is kinked at the origin (where trading gains are zero) and steeper over losses, making PT speculators loss-averse; and iv) it adds a risk-neutral term (dashed line) to PT speculators' utility when π < 0, making them less risk-averse than MV speculators over losses. Thus, Eqs. (10) and (11) capture the main properties of Eq. (9) parsimoniously. It will become clearer later that our results are likely robust to (or even strengthened by) explicitly modeling PT speculators' risk-seeking behavior. 
Prospect Theory Trading
As in Section 2.1, sometime between t = 0 and t = 1, all speculators receive the same private and noisy signal of v, S. At time t = 1, liquidity traders, MV speculators, and PT speculators 9 For instance, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) model Prospect Theory-inspired preferences in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model à la Lucas (1978) by assuming that a continuum of identical infinitely lived agents chooses a consumption level c t and an allocation of the risky asset x t to maximize
submit their optimal market orders to the MM. MV speculators submit the demand function
x MV of Eq. (3). PT speculators submit the demand function x P T maximizing EU MV +P T of Eq.
(10). Standard formulas for the moments of a truncated normal distribution (e.g., Greene, 1997, pp. 950-952) imply that
where sgn (·) is the sign function, Φ (·) and ψ (·) are the standard normal cdf and pdf, respectively,
, and Φ (sgn (x) χ) is the conditional cumulative probability of a trading loss. Let sgn (x) = 1. It then ensues that Eq. (12) becomes
and that
( 1 4 ) Besides being computationally convenient, the above assumption transforms PT speculators' probabilities nonlinearly and asymmetrically (in the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Barberis and Huang, 2008) , by overweighting low cumulative probabilities of trading losses (Φ (χ) > Φ (sgn (x) χ) when χ > sgn (x) χ). This property captures economic agents' tendency to be disproportionately afraid of the low odds of losing when choosing gambles with high odds of winning (e.g., Jullien and Salanié, 2000) . The resulting subjective (i.e., transformed) probabilities of the objective ones -a model device capturing decision weights rather than "incorrect" beliefs -play an important role in our analysis. Nonetheless, their omission, while complicating such analysis considerably, does not change the qualitative nature of our main results and intuition.
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Substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (14) and differentiating with respect to x, we then have
( 1 5 ) Intuitively, the stylized Prospect Theory preferences of Eq. (10) (i.e., γ > 0 in x P T ) have two effects of the opposite sign on the optimal trading activity of PT speculators as compared to that of MV speculators (x MV ). For any given signal S and price P , lower risk aversion in losses (which we label risk seeking) induces PT speculators to more aggressive trading, the more so the greater is Φ (χ), the conditional subjective cumulative probability of a trading loss; loss aversion instead induces PT speculators to more cautious trading in order to minimize the expected loss of Eq. (13), the more so the greater is Φ 0 (χ) = ψ (χ), the conditional marginal probability of a trading loss. To gain further insight on Eq. (15), we construct a simple numerical example by
, and γ = 3. We then plot PT and MV speculators' resulting demand schedules x P T (solid line) and x MV (thin line), as well as
in Figure 2 over the domain of P for a private signal S = 0. When prices are low (P ¿ 0), a loss is subjectively and objectively unlikely (Φ (χ) = Φ (sgn (x) χ) ≈ 0 and ψ (χ) ≈ 0) and PT speculators act as MV speculators (x P T ≈ x MV ). When prices are high (P À 0), a loss is subjectively, although not objectively, likely (Φ (χ) ≈ 1 although Φ (sgn (x) χ) ≈ 0, while ψ (χ) ≈ 0) and risk seeking dominates PT speculators' trading strategy (
Everywhere else, PT speculators' optimal trading strategy depends upon the trade-off between loss aversion and risk seeking. For instance, when P = −0.5, loss aversion leads PT speculators to more cautious trading than MV speculators' (x MV = 1 but x P T = 0.40) because the marginal probability of a loss is relatively high (ψ (P = −0.5) > Φ (P = −0.5)); when instead P = 0.5, risk-seeking leads PT speculators to more aggressive trading than MV speculators' (x MV = −1 but x P T = −4.60) because the subjective cumulative probability of a loss is relatively high (Φ (P = 0.5) > ψ (P = 0.5)).
Market Liquidity and Price Efficiency
As in Section 2.2, the MM sets the equilibrium market price according to Eq. (4), after observing the aggregate order flow ω = μx P T +(1 − μ) x MV +z from all market participants. Unfortunately, the expression for x P T in Eq. (15) makes ω a highly nonlinear function of the normally distributed private signal S, thus the MM's problem analytically intractable. There are several approaches in the literature for approximating nonlinear rational expectation models to the first order of accuracy. 12 We look for a first-order accurate solution to our model by employing a first-order approximation of x P T around the private signal's unconditional mean E [S] = 0.
Lemma 1
The first-order representation of PT speculators' optimal trading strategy of Eq. (15) is given by:
.
This representation of x P T turns out to be reasonably accurate. For instance, it is virtually indistinguishable from the true x P T of Eq. (15) when evaluated locally (e.g., the thin gray line in Figure 2 when S = 0). Eq. (16) also indicates that, in a first-order sense, risk seeking dominates loss aversion in PT speculators' market orders as a source of adverse selection risk for the MM, since the approximate loss aversion portion of x P T is deterministic. Proposition 2 accomplishes the task of solving for the semi-strong efficient market-clearing price of this economy given Eq.
(16).
Proposition 2 The first-order rational expectations equilibrium of the amended economy described by Eqs. (3), (4), and (16) when μ > 0 is uniquely characterized by
12 E.g., see Blanchard and Kahn (1980) , Klein (2000) , and Sims (2000), as well as the discussion in Lombardo and Sutherland (2007) .
A risky asset's equilibrium market liquidity in the presence of PT speculators has two noteworthy properties, novel to the literature. First, the asset's equilibrium market depth is lower than in the absence of such speculators. Intuitively, PT speculators' trading activity -stemming from the optimal resolution of a trade-off between loss aversion and risk seeking in Eq. (14) -is more aggressive than that of MV speculators, thus making the MM more vulnerable to adverse selection and the price impact of aggregate order flow higher. Second, the asset's equilibrium market depth is state-dependent. As suggested by Lemma 1, the extent to which PT speculators' optimal market orders depart from those of MV speculators in equilibrium -hence, the MM's perceived adverse selection risk -depends mainly on the expected subjective cumulative probability of a loss (Φ (χ)), a function of the realized order flow ω (i.e., of the realizations of the private signal S and the amount of noise trading z) via P P T . Foster and Viswanathan (1993) show that representing agents' beliefs with nonnormal elliptically contoured distributions is sufficient to make market liquidity state-dependent in a model of market-making à la Kyle (1985) with endogenous information acquisition. In our model, state-dependent market liquidity ensues from state-dependent preferences even when all random variables are normally distributed.
As Proposition 2 makes clear, the expression for λ P T and its relationship with the model's state variables S and z are analytically complicated since P P T is a fixed point of Eq. (17). We therefore examine the state dependency of equilibrium market depth via a numerical example.
Specifically, in the upper panel of Figure 3 we plot (by virtue of numerical integration) the average price impact λ P T and PT speculators' optimal trading activity with respect to all possible noise trading shocks z over the domain of S (i.e., E [λ P T |S] and E [x P T |S], respectively) when γ = 3
and μ = 0.1, as well as their benchmark counterparts when μ = 0 (i.e., λ MV and E [x MV |S]), in the economy of Figure 2 . As previously discussed, the presence of PT speculators always worsens a risky asset's equilibrium market liquidity:
In addition, market depth becomes countercyclical in the presence of PT speculators:
is increasing in S, i.e., equilibrium price impact is greater during "good" times (S > 0) than during "bad" times (S < 0). The intuition for this result is that in equilibrium, the subjective cumulative probability of a trading loss ( with respect to P P T . As such, the equilibrium market liquidity of a risky asset traded by PT speculators is inversely related to its (possibly unobservable) fundamental performance, hence to its closest (observable) proxy, the asset's simultaneously determined price performance.
We next assess further properties of the equilibrium of Proposition 2 by employing the Law of Iterated Expectations on E [P P T ] to approximate the first moment of λ P T (E [λ P T ]) and the second moment of P P T (var [P P T ]) as follows:
Corollary 3 Eqs. (17) and (18) imply that
and
Unreported numerical integration shows that these expressions are approximately equal to the true mean of λ P T of Eq. (18) Lastly, Eq. (4) and Corollary 3 imply that
a closed-form expression from which the following remark ensues.
Remark 1
The presence of PT speculators improves equilibrium price informativeness, the more so the greater is their fraction of the total population of speculators (higher μ) and/or the more pronounced are their PT preferences (higher γ). Its comparative statics are otherwise the same as in Corollary 2.
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and study the asset pricing implications of loss aversion at the kink of a stylized, state-dependent specification of agents'
Prospect Theory value function -but not of its curvature over gains and losses and its probability weighting component -in an otherwise standard consumption-based asset pricing model à la Lucas (1978) . In such a setting, they show that state-dependent loss aversion makes those agents' risk aversion time-varying, eventually leading to excess equilibrium price volatility over that of the underlying dividends. 13 In our model of trading, the risk seeking portion of speculative PT trading dominates the loss aversion one (e.g., see Figure 2 ). This makes PT speculators' trading 13 Consistently, in unreported analysis we show that introducing loss aversion in the preferences of an otherwise risk-neutral monopolist speculator in the basic setting of Kyle (1985) leads to more cautious informed trading, greater market liquidity, and worse price informativeness in equilibrium.
activity more aggressive than MV speculators', and the aggregate order flow more informative about the risky asset's liquidation value v (var [P P T ] > var [P MV ]), thus not only worsening equilibrium market liquidity but also improving equilibrium price efficiency. 
The Benchmark Model
We consider a market that is identical to that of Section 2. We then assume that before trading takes place, sometime between t = 0 and t = 1, both the speculators and the MM observe a public and noisy signal of the risky asset's payoff v, S p = v + e. We can think of S p as 14 Note, however, that equilibrium price informativeness is not state-dependent, for any realization of S equally affects both the conditional variance of the aggregate order flow and its conditonal covariance with the risky asset's final payoff v, thus leaving both var [P P T |S] and E [Q P T |S] unchanged in equilibrium (see Eq. (A-15) in the Appendix). 15 An incomplete list includes Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , Foster and Viswanathan (1990 , 1993 ), McKelvey and Page (1990 , Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) , Berry and Howe (1994) , Verrecchia (1994, 1997) , Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) , Fleming and Remolona (1999) , Evans and Lyons (2003) , Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) , Green (2004) , Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005) , and Pasquariello and Vega (2007) .
any public announcement (e.g., earnings or macroeconomic news) released simultaneously to all market participants. The signal noise e is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 e and independent from any other random variable. It then ensues that var
The availability of S p affects the level and improves the precision of the information of all market participants prior to trading at time t = 1, with respect to the economy of Section 2.1. The MM's revised priors about the distribution of v before trading occurs are now given by
measures the relative precision of the public signal S p . Accordingly, the speculators' revised priors about the distribution of v before trading occurs but after observing their private signal S are E [v|S,
measures the relative precision of the private signal S conditional upon observing S p and σ
Informed traders in the benchmark economy are made solely of MV speculators. The above assumptions straightforwardly imply that their optimal trading strategy after a public signal S p is released is
while the MM's market-clearing price is
Proposition 3 describes the equilibrium of this amended economy.
Proposition 3 The unique rational expectations equilibrium price P * MV of the model described by Eqs. (22) and (23) is
Consistent with Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Pasquariello and Vega (2007) , the release of a public signal improves market liquidity in subsequent trading. The availability of S p has two effects of opposite sign on the MM's perceived adverse selection risk. First, it makes speculators' private information less valuable, hence the MM's adverse selection risk less severe for it provides him with a trade-free source of information about the traded asset's final payoff v. Second, it makes the trading activity of risk-averse MV speculators in the risky asset more aggressive for it reduces the conditional variance of v (σ
. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , which plots MV speculators' optimal market orders x MV of Eq. (3) (dotted line) and x * MV of Eq. (22) (solid line) over the domain of P for a private signal S = 0 and a public signal S p = 0 in the economy of Figure 2 . As clear from Figure 4 , the availability of S p causes MV speculators'
optimal trading strategy to tilt up at the origin (since S p = 0). In equilibrium, the first effect dominates the second and market depth improves. Accordingly, the percentage improvement in liquidity, defined as
is increasing in φ p , the relative precision of S p , i.e., in its value and quality, as follows.
Remark 2 The percentage decrease in the order flow's price impact when S p is available is increasing in σ 2 v and decreasing in σ 2 e .
The availability of a public signal also improves equilibrium price informativeness. In particular, Eq. (7) and the above distributional assumptions imply that (Q *
MV , where 
Prospect Theory Trading
We extend the model of Section 4.1 to allow a portion μ of the mass of speculators to be characterized by the Prospect Theory-inspired preferences of Eqs. (10) and (11). Consistent with Section 3.2, when a public signal S p is available PT speculators choose the demand schedule
where, because of the properties of truncated conditional normal distributions and sign (x) = 1,
and χ
. Differentiating the resulting expression for EU * MV +P T with respect to x gives
The optimal trading strategy of PT speculators in the presence of a public signal is similar to x P T of Eq. (15). As discussed in Section 3.2, their market orders are driven by three effects:
First, risk aversion leads to cautious trading, as for MV speculators, the more so the greater is the uncertainty surrounding the asset's final payoff v; second, risk seeking leads to more aggressive trading, the more so the greater is the conditional subjective cumulative probability of a loss given S and S p , Φ (χ * ); third, loss aversion leads to more cautious trading, the more so the greater is the conditional marginal probability of a loss given S p , Φ 0 (χ * ) = ψ (χ * ). Yet, the extent to which these forces manifest and interact in Eq. (30) is now affected by the availability of S p in a complex fashion, since the latter not only reduces the conditional variance of v (σ
but also affects both Φ (χ * ) and ψ (χ * ). For instance, Figure 4 plots PT speculators' optimal market orders x P T of Eq. (15) (dashed gray line) and x * P T of Eq. (30) (solid line) over the domain of P for a private signal S = 0 and a public signal S p = 0 in the economy of Figure 2 .
In this example, the availability of S p makes PT speculators' optimal trading strategy generally more aggressive except in the region of P by the origin, where loss aversion (so trading caution)
is most relevant.
As in Section 3.2, we look for a first-order accurate equilibrium of this amended economy by employing a first-order approximation of x * P T around the private signal's conditional mean given
Using arguments similar to those in the proof to Lemma 1, we get
. Again, the first-order representation of x * P T in Eq. (31) Proposition 4 The first-order rational expectations equilibrium of the amended economy described by Eqs. (22), (23), and (31) when μ > 0 is uniquely characterized by
Proposition 4 generates novel predictions for the impact of the release of public news on market liquidity and price efficiency. According to Eq. (33), the availability of public information improves market liquidity regardless of whether a fraction of informed trading in the aggregate order flow comes from PT speculators. In particular, Proposition 4 indicates that a public signal S p of v alleviates the MM's perceived adverse selection risk more than the greater aggressiveness of both PT and MV speculators' optimal trading strategies (e.g., as displayed in Figure 4 ) in response to S p may aggravate it. As in Eq. (26), we measure the extent of such improvement in market depth when μ > 0 as
. We learn further properties of this equilibrium by applying the Law of Iterated Expectations to E [P *
P T ] in the following corollary.
Corollary 5 Eqs. (32), (33), and (34) imply that
where var [P *
, and
Consistent with the above arguments (as in Section 4.1), the availability of a trade-free source of information about v improves price efficiency more than the less volatile (i.e., informative)
aggregate order flow in equilibrium may deteriorate it. Indeed, Eqs. (7) and (36) imply that
Intuitively, the availability of a public signal has a greater impact on price efficiency when, ceteris paribus for S p , speculators as a whole trade less cautiously. Hence, price informativeness is increasing in the fraction of the total population of informed traders made of PT speculators (μ) and in the kink in their PT preferences (γ), since both increase the informativeness of the aggregate order flow.
Corollary 6 Equilibrium price informativeness when S p is available and μ > 0 is increasing in μ and γ. Its comparative statics are otherwise the same as in Corollary 4.
As interestingly, Proposition 4 and Corollary 5 further indicate that when a public signal S p is available in an economy characterized by the presence of PT speculators, equilibrium market depth and price efficiency are dependent upon realizations of both the private signal S and the public signal (as well as of noise trading z). Such dependency is analytically complicated, thus best illustrated via a numerical example. Specifically, we assume that σ 2 e = 1 and consider the release of neutral (N), negative (L), or positive (H) public news -either
83 -in the economy of Figure 2 . We then use numerical integration to plot, in the left panel of Figure 5 , the ensuing average equilibrium price impact λ * P T with respect to all possible shocks z over the domain of S when γ = 3 and We also plot, in the center panel of Figure 5 , the corresponding average percentage improvement in market depth conditional upon S and S p , computed according to Eq. (34) - Figure 5 suggests that ceteris paribus for the private signal S, the better is the public news released (i.e., the higher is S p ) the lower is λ * P T and the greater is the improvement in market liquidity stemming from its release. 16 The intuition for this result is that ceteris paribus for S, the higher is S p the lower is the expected subjective cumulative loss probability (E Prospect Theory-inspired preferences (γ), the greater is the percentage improvement in market liquidity induced by S p : The public signal reduces the expected subjective cumulative loss probability relative to when S p is unavailable, thus attenuating PT speculators' trading aggressiveness.
Vice versa, when bad public news is released (S p < 0), the expected subjective cumulative loss probability relative to when S p is unavailable increases, thus inducing PT speculators to less caution in their trading activity. Similarly, the improvement in market liquidity following the release of a good (bad) public signal is smaller (greater) when the private signal S is of poorer quality, i.e., when σ 2 u is higher: The latter unequivocally reduces the MM's adverse selection risk, thus attenuating (magnifying) his concern for PT speculators' lower (greater) trading aggressiveness in the order flow.
17
Lastly, ceteris paribus for S, price efficiency too becomes procyclical in the presence of PT speculators when a public signal is released. This is shown in the right panel of Figure 5 , where we plot the average price informativeness conditional upon S and S p computed according to Eqs.
(4) and (36):
is increasing in both S and S p , i.e., price efficiency is greater during good times (S > 0 or S p > 0) than during bad times (S < 0 or S p > 0). Intuitively, ceteris paribus for S (S p ), a higher public (private) signal S p (S) increases PT speculators' expected subjective cumulative loss probability (E [Φ (χ * ) |S, S p ]) -hence enhancing their risk-seeking behavior -and decreases their expected marginal loss probability (
attenuating their loss-averse behavior -via P * P T . In equilibrium, these two effects lead PT speculators to more aggressive trading, thus making the aggregate order flow more informative
The dependency of (absolute and relative) price impact and price informativeness on realizations of public news is novel to the literature because, as previously emphasized in section 3.2, it is due to unconventional, Prospect Theory-inspired, state-dependent preferences rather than unconventional representations of agents' beliefs, as in Foster and Viswanathan (1993) . This dependency is also important for testing our model's implications, since the econometrician may only observe S p when estimating a traded asset's market liquidity and price efficiency.
Conclusions
This paper studies the implications of the main features of Tversky and Kahneman's (1979) Prospect Theory -risk seeking over losses, loss aversion, and nonlinear and asymmetric prob- 17 In addition, when neutral public news is released (S p = 0), E [∆λ * P T |S p ] is insensitive to μ, γ, and σ 2 u since
ability weighting (in the spirit of Jullien and Salanié, 2000) -for market liquidity and price informativeness. Our model indicates that risk seeking induces better-informed agents with Prospect theory-inspired preferences to trade more aggressively with their private signals, while loss aversion induces them to use those signals more cautiously. We demonstrate that, because the former effect either prevails on or is reinforced by the latter in equilibrium, the presence of these unconventional speculators in an otherwise standard economy worsens adverse selectionbased market liquidity, makes it countercyclical, and ameliorates price efficiency. We also find that the presence of those speculators affects the extent to which the availability of public news about the traded asset's fundamentals improves market liquidity and price informativeness and makes such improvement procyclical.
These and other predictions of our model are novel and warrant further empirical investigation. Our analysis also raises several unexplored questions. In particular, we note that for simplicity's sake, our model allows for a single round of trading over a single risky asset. Speculators' risk seeking and loss aversion are likely to provide interesting (yet complex) insights for their multiperiod, multiasset trading strategies, especially if combined with that particular form of mental accounting (Thaler, 1980) often displayed by individuals in experimental settings known as narrow framing. 18 Consistently, the portfolio decisions of such agents and their implications for asset pricing have received increasing attention in the literature (e.g., Levy, De Giorgi, and Hens, 2003; Levy and Levy, 2007; Barberis and Huang, 2008) . We look forward to future research that investigates the implications of dynamic portfolio decisions for market liquidity and price efficiency.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove this statement by using Eq. (3) and properties of conditional normal distributions to solve for P MV from Eq. (4). We begin by observing that the distributional assumptions of Section 2.1 imply that the order flow ω = x MV + z is normally distributed with mean E [ω] = −C MV P and variance
z , where
v , it then follows (e.g., Greene, 1997, p. 90 ) that:
Substituting the expression for C MV (Eq. (A-1)) into Eq. (A-3) and observing that φ = Proof of Corollary 1. The statement of the corollary follows from
Proof of Corollary 2. Substitution of Eq. (8) in the expression for Q MV (Eq. (7)) implies that
It then ensues that
Proof of Lemma 1. The expression in Eq. (16) . We begin by observing that x MV of Eq. (3) can be expressed as a function of χ =
Eq. (A-5) implies that x P T of Eq. (15) can be written as
Since x P T (χ) is a function of χ differentiable in a neighborhood of χ, it then ensues that
According to properties of the normal distributions (e.g., Maddala, 1999, p. 367 
and ψ 0 (χ) = −χψ (χ). The approximation for x MV in Eq. (A-7) then becomes
which straightforwardly reduces to Eq. (16).
Proof of Proposition 2. As for Proposition 1, we prove this statement by using Eq. (16) and properties of conditional normal distributions to solve for P P T from Eq. (4). We begin by observing that the definition of ω = μx P T + (1 − μ) x MV + z and Eqs. (3) and (16) imply that
The distributional assumptions of Section 2.1 imply that ω is normally distributed with mean
v , it then follows from Eq. (A-2) that
Substituting the expression for C P T (Eq. (A-10)) into Eq. (A-11) and observing that φ = ), the right side of Eq. (A-11) is decreasing in P for reasonable parameter values, thus ensuring that the fixed point is unique. Lastly, λ P T > λ MV since Φ (·) is bounded between zero and one and both γ and μ are positive.
Proof of Corollary 3. We prove this statement in three steps. First, we observe that given a random variable y with mean y and variance σ 2 y and a nonlinear function g (y), firstorder Taylor series expansion around y provides a natural approximation of that function's first moment (e.g., Greene, 1997, pp. 66-67) , i.e.
Second, we use the Law of Iterated Expectations (e.g., Greene, 1997, p. 82) and Eq. (4) to show that
In addition, it stems from the joint normality of v and ω that
The Law of Total Variance (e.g., Greene, 1997, p. 83) and Eq. (4) then imply that
Finally, applying Eq. (A-12) to λ P T of Eq. (18) leads to
where C P T is defined in Eq. (A-10), Eq. (A-15) becomes
( A -1 9 )
Applying Eq. (A-12) to Eq. (A-19) gives
, i.e., the approximation in Eq. (20).
Proof of Remark 1. Substitution of Eq. (20) in the expression for Q P T (Eq. (21)) implies that
< 0, and
Proof of Proposition 3. As for Proposition 1, we prove this statement by using Eq. (22) and properties of conditional normal distributions to solve for P * MV from Eq. (23). We begin by observing that the distributional assumptions of Section 4.1 imply that conditional upon observing the public signal S p , the order flow ω = x * MV + z is normally distributed with mean
Substituting the expression for C MV (Eq. (A-22) 
2 < 0 and
Proof of Corollary 4. Substitution of Eq. (27) in the expression for Q * MV in Section 4.1 implies that
2 < 0, and
Proof of Proposition 4. As for Proposition 3, we prove this statement by using Eq.
(31) and properties of conditional normal distributions to solve for P * P T from Eq. (23). Since Eqs. (22) and (31) imply that
The distributional assumptions of Section 4.1 imply that conditional upon observing the public signal S p , ω is normally distributed with mean
v , it then follows from Eq. (A-23) that ), the right side of Eq. (A-28) is decreasing in P for reasonable parameter values, thus ensuring that the fixed point is unique. Lastly, numerical evaluation also shows that λ * P T < λ P T since λ * MV < λ MV < λ P T and Φ (·) is bounded between zero and one.
Proof of Corollary 5. We prove this statement using arguments similar to those in the proof of Corollary 3. In particular, the Law of Iterated Expectations (e.g., Greene, 1997, p. 82) and Eq. (23) imply that
In addition, it stems from the joint normality of v and ω conditional upon observing the public
The Law of Total Variance (e.g., Greene, 1997, p. 83) and Eq. (23) then imply that
Applying Eq. (A-29) to λ * P T of Eq. (33) then leads to
z , where C * P T is defined in Eq. (A-27), Eq. (A-31) becomes
Applying Eq. (A-12) to Eq. (A-35) gives
where 
i.e., the expression in Eq. (37).
Proof of Corollary 6. Substitution of Eq. (36) in the expression for Q * P T in Section 4.2 implies that
Proof of Remark 3. Eq. (37) and the observation that φ =
Eq. (A-41) and properties of Φ (·) then imply that 
